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Title Authors Conference Year DOI
Where Are the Really Hard Manipulation Problems? The Phase Transition in Manipulating the Veto Rule T. Walsh IJCAI 2009 10.5555/1661445.1661497
Unsupervised Rank Aggregation with Domain-Specific Expertise A. Klementiev et al. IJCAI 2009 10.5555/1661445.1661621
Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes L. Xia, V. Conitzer AAAI 2010 10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7626
Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules N. Narodytska, T. Walsh, L. Xia AAAI 2011 10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7872
Choosing Collectively Optimal Sets of Alternatives Based on the Condorcet Criterion E. Elkind, J. Lang, A. Saffidine IJCAI 2011 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-042
Complexity of and Algorithms for Borda Manipulation J. Davies et al. AAAI 2011 10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7873
Hypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-Issue Domains V. Conitzer, J. Lang, L. Xia IJCAI 2011 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-038
Robust Approximation and Incremental Elicitation in Voting Protocols T. Lu, C. Boutilier IJCAI 2011 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-058
Budgeted Social Choice: From Consensus to Personalized Decision Making T. Lu, C. Boutilier IJCAI 2011 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-057
Solving Election Manipulation Using Integer Partitioning Problems A. Lin AAMAS 2011 10.5555/2031678.2031700
Majority-Rule-Based Preference Aggregation on Multi-Attribute Domains with CP-Nets M. Li, Q. Vo, R. Kowalczyk AAMAS 2011 10.5555/2031678.2031711
On the Fixed-Parameter Tractability of Composition-Consistent Tournament Solutions F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. Seedig IJCAI 2011 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-026
Voter Response to Iterated Poll Information A. Reijngoud, U. Endriss AAMAS 2012 10.5555/2343776.2343787
Efficient Vote Elicitation under Candidate Uncertainty J. Oren, Y. Filmus, C. Boutilier IJCAI 2013 10.5555/2540128.2540174
Multi-Dimensional Single-Peaked Consistency and Its Approximations X. Sui, A. Francois-Nienaber, C. Boutilier IJCAI 2013 10.5555/2540128.2540183
Ties Matter: Complexity of Manipulation when Tie-Breaking with a Random Vote H. Aziz et al. AAAI 2013 10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8701
Empirical analysis of plurality election equilibria D. Thompson et al. AAMAS 2013 10.5555/2484920.2484983
Elicitation and Approximately Stable Matching with Partial Preferences J. Drummond, C. Boutilier IJCAI 2013 10.5555/2540128.2540145
Better Human Computation Through Principled Voting A. Mao, A. Procaccia, Y. Chen AAAI 2013 10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8460
Multi-Winner Social Choice with Incomplete Preferences T. Lu, C. Boutilier IJCAI 2013 10.5555/2540128.2540168
Social Rankings in Human-Computer Committees M. Bitan et al. AAAI 2013 10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8610
How to Change a Group's Collective Decision? N. Hazon, R. Lin, S. Kraus IJCAI 2013 10.5555/2540128.2540159
Achieving Fully Proportional Representation Is Easy in Practice P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko AAMAS 2013 10.5555/2484920.2484985
Voting with Rank Dependent Scoring Rules J. Goldsmith et al. AAAI 2014 10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8826
Robust Winners and Winner Determination Policies under Candidate Uncertainty C. Boutilier et al. AAAI 2014 10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8893
Empathetic social choice on social networks A. Salehi-Abari, C. Boutilier AAMAS 2014 10.5555/2615731.2615843
Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty R. Bredereck et al. IJCAI 2015 10.5555/2832249.2832272
A Study of Human Behavior in Online Voting M. Tal, R. Meir, Y. Gal AAMAS 2015 10.5555/2772879.2773240
Conventional Machine Learning for Social Choice J. Doucette, K. Larson, R. Cohen AAAI 2015 10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9294
Reasoning with PCP-nets in a Multi-Agent Context C. Cornelio et al. AAMAS 2015 10.5555/2772879.2773276
Characterization of Scoring Rules with Distances: Application to the Clustering of Rankings P. Viappiani IJCAI 2015 10.5555/2832249.2832264
Aggregating Partial Rankings with Applications to Peer Grading in Massive Online Open Courses I. Caragiannis, G. Krimpas, A. Voudouris AAMAS 2015 10.5555/2772879.2773241
Adapting the Social Network to Affect Elections S. Sina et al. AAMAS 2015 10.5555/2772879.2773244
On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm H. Aziz, H. Seedig, J. von Wedel AAMAS 2015 10.5555/2772879.2773272
Voting Rules as Error-Correcting Codes A. Procaccia, N. Shah, Y. Zick AAAI 2015 10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9292
The Power of Local Manipulation Strategies in Assignment Mechanisms T. Mennle et al. IJCAI 2015 10.5555/2832249.2832261
Lie on the Fly: Iterative Voting Center with Manipulative Voters L. Naamani-Dery et al. IJCAI 2015 10.5555/2832415.2832531
Subset Selection via Implicit Utilitarian Voting I. Caragiannis et al. IJCAI 2016 10.5555/3060621.3060643
Judgment Aggregation under Issue Dependencies M. Costantini, C. Groenland, U. Endriss AAAI 2016 10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10018
Minimising the Rank Aggregation Error M. M. de Weerdt, E. H. Gerding, S. Stein AAMAS 2016 10.5555/2936924.2937167