Choosing Collectively Optimal Sets of Alternatives Based on the Condorcet Criterion

E. Elkind, J. Lang, A. Saffidine
IJCAI 2011
Abstract
None

Remarks: There is a journal version: Edith Elkind, Jérôme Lang, Abdallah Saffidine, Condorcet winning sets. Soc. Choice Welf. 44(3): 493-517 (2015)

Experiments:

Election type Culture Candidates Voters Instances Parameters
Ordinal Impartial Culture {15, 50, 100} {10, 11, 20, 21, 100, 101} None None
Ordinal Impartial Culture {30} [1-100] None None
Ordinal Impartial Culture {20} {5, 8, 20, 500, 2000} None None