Dynamic Proportional Rankings

J. Israel, M. Brill
IJCAI 2021
Abstract
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where submitted questions need to be ranked based on the interests of the audience, we study a dynamic extension of the proportional rankings setting. In our setting, the goal is to maintain the proportionality of a ranking when alternatives (i.e., questions)---not necessarily from the top of the ranking---get selected sequentially. We propose generalizations of well-known aggregation rules to this setting and study their monotonicity and proportionality properties. We also evaluate the performance of these rules experimentally, using realistic probabilistic assumptions on the selection procedure.

Experiments:

Election type Culture Candidates Voters Instances Parameters
Approval Euclidean 2D {20} {60} 100 there are multiple Gaussians with equidistant center points and both voters and candidates are sampled points from one of these Gaussians
Approval Other {20} {60} 100 None