A Framework for Approval-Based Budgeting Methods
N. Talmon, P. Faliszewski
AAAI 2019
Abstract
We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.
Experiments:
| Election type |
Culture |
Candidates |
Voters |
Instances |
Parameters |
| Approval |
Euclidean 2D |
{20} |
{35} |
100 |
[0,1]x[0,1] plane; 1. 20 voters, positioned uniformly on the whole 1 × 1 square; 2. 5 items, termed global items, which are also positioned uniformly on the square; and another 30 items, termed local items, also positioned uniformly on the square; |
| Approval |
Euclidean 2D |
{50, 100} |
{50} |
100 |
[0,1]x[0,1] plane; 1. voters, positioned uniformly on a disc of radius 0.3, centered at position (0.5, 0.5); we have 50 such voters for Experiment 1 and 100 for Experiment 2; 2. 50 cheap items, positioned uniformly on a disc of radius 0.2, centered at (0.3, 0.5), and 50 expensive items, positioned uniformly on a disc of radius 0.2, centered at (0.7, 0.5); |