Perpetual Voting: Fairness in Long-Term Decision Making

M. Lackner

Election type Approval
Culture Euclidean 2D
Candidates {20}
Voters {5}
Instances 200000
10000 instances x 20 decisions (sequences)
Parameters Voters are split in two groups and are placed on the 2d plane by a bivariate normal distribution. For the first group (6 voters) both x- and y-coordinates are independently drawn from N (-0.5, 0.2); for the second group (14 voters) x- and y-coordinates are from N (0.5, 0.2). That is, the first, smaller group is centered around (-0.5, -0.5), the second, larger group around (0.5, 0.5). Alternatives are distributed uniformly in the rectangle [-1, 1] × [-1, 1]. Voters approve all alternatives that have a distance of at most 1.5 times the distance to the closest alternative. This yields approval sets of size 1.8 on average. It is important to note that alternatives change in every round and thus even voters that are close to each other do not necessarily have the same approval sets each round.
Notes Section 6. “Experiments”. Experiments on perpetual voting model, 20 sequential decisions with changing preferences.