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Title Authors Conference Year DOI
Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions T. Allouche et al. IJCAI 2020 10.24963/ijcai.2020/3
Truth-Tracking via Approval Voting: Size Matters T. Allouche, J. Lang, F. Yger AAAI 2022 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20403
Single Transferable Vote: Incomplete Knowledge and Communication Issues M. Ayadi et al. AAMAS 2019 10.5555/3306127.3331833
Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules H. Aziz et al. IJCAI 2018 10.24963/ijcai.2018/8
Ties Matter: Complexity of Manipulation when Tie-Breaking with a Random Vote H. Aziz et al. AAAI 2013 10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8701
Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: A Probabilistic Social Choice Function H. Aziz, P. Luo, C. Rizkallah AAAI 2018 10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11448
On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm H. Aziz, H. Seedig, J. von Wedel AAMAS 2015 10.5555/2772879.2773272
Misrepresentation in District Voting Y. Bachrach et al. IJCAI 2016 10.5555/3060621.3060633
Manipulation of Hamming-based Approval Voting for Multiple Referenda and Committee Elections N. Barrot, J. Lang, M. Yokoo AAMAS 2017 10.5555/3091125.3091212
Time-Constrained Participatory Budgeting Under Uncertain Project Costs D. Baumeister, L. Boes, C. Laußmann IJCAI 2022 10.24963/ijcai.2022/11
How Hard Is the Manipulative Design of Scoring Systems? D. Baumeister, T. Hogrebe IJCAI 2019 10.24963/ijcai.2019/11
Manipulation of Opinion Polls to Influence Iterative Elections D. Baumeister, A. Selker, A. Wilczynski AAMAS 2020 10.5555/3398761.3398782
Bisimulations for Verifying Strategic Abilities with an Application to ThreeBallot F. Belardinelli et al. AAMAS 2017 10.5555/3091125.3091303
Combining Fairness and Optimality when Selecting and Allocating Projects K. Belahcène, V. Mousseau, A. Wilczynski IJCAI 2021 10.24963/ijcai.2021/6
Preference Elicitation For Participatory Budgeting G. Benade et al. AAAI 2017 10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10563
Low-Distortion Social Welfare Functions G. Benadè, A. Procaccia, M. Qiao AAAI 2019 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011788
Comparing Election Methods Where Each Voter Ranks Only Few Candidates M. Bentert, P. Skowron AAAI 2020 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5598
Social Rankings in Human-Computer Committees M. Bitan et al. AAAI 2013 10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8610
Did That Lost Ballot Box Cost Me a Seat? Computing Manipulations of STV Elections M. Blom et al. AAAI 2020 10.1609/aaai.v34i08.7029
Putting a Compass on the Map of Elections N. Boehmer et al. IJCAI 2021 10.24963/ijcai.2021/9
Winner Robustness via Swap- and Shift-Bribery: Parameterized Counting Complexity and Experiments N. Boehmer et al. IJCAI 2021 10.24963/ijcai.2021/8
Rank Aggregation Using Scoring Rules N. Boehmer, R. Bredereck, D. Peters AAAI 2023 10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25685
Properties of Position Matrices and Their Elections N. Boehmer et al. AAAI 2023 10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25684
Understanding Distance Measures Among Elections N. Boehmer et al. IJCAI 2022 10.24963/ijcai.2022/15
A Map of Diverse Synthetic Stable Roommates Instances N. Boehmer, K. Heeger, S. Szufa AAMAS 2023 10.5555/3545946.3598740
Collecting, Classifying, Analyzing, and Using Real-World Ranking Data N. Boehmer, N. Schaar AAMAS 2023 10.5555/3545946.3598829
Automated Justification of Collective Decisions via Constraint Solving A. Boixel, U. Endriss AAMAS 2020 10.5555/3398761.3398786
Let's Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics S. Botan, S. Rey, Z. Terzopoulou IJCAI 2022 10.24963/ijcai.2022/18
Robust Winners and Winner Determination Policies under Candidate Uncertainty C. Boutilier et al. AAAI 2014 10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8893
An Analytical and Experimental Comparison of Maximal Lottery Schemes F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Stricker IJCAI 2018 10.24963/ijcai.2018/16
On the Fixed-Parameter Tractability of Composition-Consistent Tournament Solutions F. Brandt, M. Brill, H. Seedig IJCAI 2011 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-026
Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data F. Brandt, C. Geist, M. Strobel AAMAS 2016 10.5555/2936924.2936981
Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, M. Strobel AAMAS 2019 10.5555/3306127.3331735
Majority Graphs of Assignment Problems and Properties of Popular Random Assignments F. Brandt, J. Hofbauer, M. Suderland AAMAS 2017 10.5555/3091125.3091178
Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty R. Bredereck et al. IJCAI 2015 10.5555/2832249.2832272
An Experimental View on Committees Providing Justified Representation R. Bredereck et al. IJCAI 2019 10.24963/ijcai.2019/16
Approximation Algorithms for BalancedCC Multiwinner Rules M. Brill et al. AAMAS 2019 10.5555/3306127.3331732
Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting M. Brill et al. AAAI 2022 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20418
Margin of Victory in Tournaments: Structural and Experimental Results M. Brill, U. Schmidt-Kraepelin, W. Suksompong AAAI 2021 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16660
Optimizing Positional Scoring Rules for Rank Aggregation I. Caragiannis et al. AAAI 2017 10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10585