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Title Authors Conference Year DOI
Lie on the Fly: Iterative Voting Center with Manipulative Voters L. Naamani-Dery et al. IJCAI 2015 10.5555/2832415.2832531
A Graph-Based Algorithm for the Automated Justification of Collective Decisions O. Nardi, A. Boixel, U. Endriss AAMAS 2022 10.5555/3535850.3535955
Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules N. Narodytska, T. Walsh, L. Xia AAAI 2011 10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7872
Efficient and Accurate Learning of Mixtures of Plackett-Luce Models D. Nguyen, A. Zhang AAAI 2023 10.1609/aaai.v37i8.26114
A Voting-Based System for Ethical Decision Making R. Noothigattu et al. AAAI 2018 10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11512
Efficient Vote Elicitation under Candidate Uncertainty J. Oren, Y. Filmus, C. Boutilier IJCAI 2013 10.5555/2540128.2540174
Collective Schedules: Scheduling Meets Computational Social Choice F. Pascual, K. Rzadca, P. Skowron AAMAS 2018 10.5555/3237383.3237482
Preference Elicitation as Average-Case Sorting D. Peters, A. Procaccia AAAI 2021 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16709
Objective Social Choice: Using Auxiliary Information to Improve Voting Outcomes S. Pitis, M. R. Zhang AAMAS 2020 10.5555/3398761.3398885
Voting Rules as Error-Correcting Codes A. Procaccia, N. Shah, Y. Zick AAAI 2015 10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9292
Optimal Aggregation of Uncertain Preferences A. Procaccia, N. Shah AAAI 2016 10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10017
Voter Response to Iterated Poll Information A. Reijngoud, U. Endriss AAMAS 2012 10.5555/2343776.2343787
DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections K. Relia IJCAI 2022 10.24963/ijcai.2022/714
Empathetic social choice on social networks A. Salehi-Abari, C. Boutilier AAMAS 2014 10.5555/2615731.2615843
Heuristic Strategies in Uncertain Approval Voting Environments J. Scheuerman et al. AAMAS 2020 10.5555/3398761.3399052
Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting J. Scheuerman et al. AAAI 2021 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16716
Adapting the Social Network to Affect Elections S. Sina et al. AAMAS 2015 10.5555/2772879.2773244
Achieving Fully Proportional Representation Is Easy in Practice P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko AAMAS 2013 10.5555/2484920.2484985
Proportional Rankings P. Skowron et al. IJCAI 2017 10.24963/ijcai.2017/58
Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Sampling and Tree Recognition J. Sliwinski, E. Elkind IJCAI 2019 10.24963/ijcai.2019/82
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting G. Sreedurga, M. Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari IJCAI 2022 10.24963/ijcai.2022/70
Multi-Dimensional Single-Peaked Consistency and Its Approximations X. Sui, A. Francois-Nienaber, C. Boutilier IJCAI 2013 10.5555/2540128.2540183
Justifying Social-Choice Mechanism Outcome for Improving Participant Satisfaction S. Suryanarayana, D. Sarne, S. Kraus AAMAS 2022 10.5555/3535850.3535989
How to Sample Approval Elections? S. Szufa et al. IJCAI 2022 10.24963/ijcai.2022/71
Drawing a Map of Elections in the Space of Statistical Cultures S. Szufa et al. AAMAS 2020 10.5555/3398761.3398916
A Framework for Approval-Based Budgeting Methods N. Talmon, P. Faliszewski AAAI 2019 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012181
A Study of Human Behavior in Online Voting M. Tal, R. Meir, Y. Gal AAMAS 2015 10.5555/2772879.2773240
Voting with Limited Energy: A Study of Plurality and Borda Z. Terzopoulou AAMAS 2023 10.5555/3545946.3598882
Empirical analysis of plurality election equilibria D. Thompson et al. AAMAS 2013 10.5555/2484920.2484983
The Positronic Economist: A Computational System for Analyzing Economic Mechanisms D. Thompson, N. Newman, K. Leyton-Brown AAAI 2017 10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10592
Ballot Length in Instant Runoff Voting K. Tomlinson, J. Ugander, J. Kleinberg AAAI 2023 10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25724
Boundedly Rational Voters in Large(r) Networks A. Tsang, A. Salehi-Abari, K. Larson AAMAS 2018 10.5555/3237383.3237432
Characterization of Scoring Rules with Distances: Application to the Clustering of Rankings P. Viappiani IJCAI 2015 10.5555/2832249.2832264
Where Are the Really Hard Manipulation Problems? The Phase Transition in Manipulating the Veto Rule T. Walsh IJCAI 2009 10.5555/1661445.1661497
Practical Algorithms for Multi-Stage Voting Rules with Parallel Universes Tiebreaking J. Wang et al. AAAI 2019 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012189
Bounded Incentives in Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule Z. Wang, Z. Wei, J. Zhang AAAI 2020 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5605
Minimising the Rank Aggregation Error M. M. de Weerdt, E. H. Gerding, S. Stein AAMAS 2016 10.5555/2936924.2937167
Controlling Elections through Social Influence B. Wilder, Y. Vorobeychik AAMAS 2018 10.5555/3237383.3237428
Poll-Confident Voters in Iterative Voting A. Wilczynski AAAI 2019 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012205
Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes L. Xia, V. Conitzer AAAI 2010 10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7626